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INTRODUCTION 
On May 16, 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
issued a landmark decision in United States v. Esquenazi in which an appel-
late court defined for the first time the term “instrumentality” of a foreign 
government as it is used in the definition of a “foreign official” under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).1 The decision set out a new two-part 
test and list of factors for determining what constitutes an “instrumentality” 
of a foreign government under the FCPA and provided much needed clarity 
as to the meaning of a “foreign official” under the statute.2 The decision also 
affirmed an interpretation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that state-owned and state-
controlled entities could be considered “instrumentalities” of a foreign 
government subject to the FCPA, an interpretation that was sometimes 
challenged by defendants charged with FCPA violations.3 In this respect, 
Esquenazi has been viewed as settling an open question of law as to whether 
officers and employees of state-owned and state-controlled entities are indeed 
“foreign officials” prohibited from receiving bribes under the FCPA.4 
Companies operating on an international basis should carefully review 
the Esquenazi decision and adopt certain best practices in light of the deci-
sion. This would include reviewing and modifying their existing compli-
ance programs to make sure that they address the two-part test and list of 
factors that the court provided in determining whether an entity constitutes an 
                                                                                                                         
1 752 F.3d 912, 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. Oct. 6, 
2014); Samuel Rubenfeld, U.S. Appeals Court Defines ‘Instrumentality’ Under the FCPA for 
First Time, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (May 16, 2014, 3:33 PM) http://blogs.wsj.com/riskand 
compliance/2014/05/16/u-s-appeals-court-defines-instrumentality-under-the-fcpa-for-first
 -time/, archived at http://perma.cc/55G9-DZDG?type=pdf; see generally Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78(a), (m), (dd), (ff), (2012)). 
2 See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 920, 925–26. 
3 See Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice and Enforcement Division 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, A Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act 20 (Nov. 4, 2012), available at http://perma.cc/64PX-W55B 
[hereinafter Resource Guide]; see also Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, United States 
v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (illustrating a case where the 
defendants challenged this interpretation); Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Counts 1 through 10 of the Indictment, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 9-00077-JVS, 
2011 WL 5101701, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011) (illustrating a case where the defendants 
challenged this interpretation). 
4 Tara K. Giunta et al., Appellate Court Clarifies FCPA “Instrumentality” Definition, 
PAUL HASTINGS (May 2014), available at http://perma.cc/WGG2-K898; Roger M. Witten et 
al., Eleventh Circuit Adopts Broad Definition of Government “Instrumentality” Under FCPA, 
WILMERHALE (May 22, 2014), http://www.wilmerhale.com/pages/publicationsandnewsdetail 
.aspx?NewsPubId=17179872427, archived at http://perma.cc/H9TV-7CFL. 
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“instrumentality” under the FCPA. Companies that take such proactive steps 
will find themselves better prepared to stay in compliance in a post-Esquenazi 
compliance environment. 
This Article will provide a basic outline of the FCPA and emphasize the 
definitions of “instrumentality” and “foreign official” as those terms are used 
in the statute. The Article will then look at federal court interpretations prior 
to Esquenazi as to when an entity, and more specifically a state-owned entity, 
could be considered an “instrumentality” of a foreign government so as to 
qualify individuals under that entity as being “foreign officials” under the 
FCPA. The Article will explore additional DOJ and SEC guidance in the 
area. The Esquenazi decision and its two-part test for when an entity con-
stitutes an “instrumentality” of a foreign government under the FCPA will 
then be discussed. Finally, this Article will give its recommendations as to 
certain best practices and modifications to compliance programs that com-
panies should consider adopting in light of the Esquenazi decision. 
I. THE FCPA 
The FCPA establishes civil and criminal liability for the bribery of for-
eign government officials in order to obtain or retain business.5 The anti-
bribery law can be divided into accounting and anti-bribery prohibitions.6 
                                                                                                                         
5 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a) (2012). The FCPA became law in 1977 and 
was created in response to a report issued by the SEC in 1976 that found that many public 
companies had engaged in questionable payments overseas and falsified their accounting 
with respect to such payments in their books and records. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 
(1977); H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 1–2 (1977); see generally S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS. & 
URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., REP. OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ON QUESTIONABLE & 
ILLEGAL CORP. PAYMENTS & PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976). Prior to the FCPA, there 
were no domestic laws prohibiting domestic companies from paying bribes to foreign gov-
ernment officials nor specific provisions in the federal securities laws explicitly prohibit-
ing such payments of, or disclosure of, bribes to foreign officials. See DONALD R. CRUVER, 
COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE FOR U.S. FIRMS 
DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 1 (2d ed. 1999). The FCPA is both 
a civil and criminal statute, and the DOJ is responsible for criminal enforcement of the 
FCPA and civil enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions against non-issuers, and the 
SEC is responsible for civil enforcement of the accounting provisions and for civil 
enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions with respect to issuers. See Mike Koehler, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. 
L. REV. 389, 395–96 (2010). 
6 See §§ 78m(b)(2), 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). The FCPA was amended in 1988 to revise 
and clarify several of its provisions in response to criticisms of the original statute. 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 5001–5003, 
102 Stat. 1107, 1415–25 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff). The 
statute was amended again in 1998 to conform its provisions to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
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A. General Statute 
The FCPA accounting provisions require that domestic and foreign com-
panies with securities publicly traded in the United States properly report 
the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.7 More specifi-
cally, the accounting provisions require that issuers, companies that have a 
class of securities registered with the SEC or that are required to file reports 
with the SEC, maintain certain recordkeeping standards and internal ac-
counting controls.8 The recordkeeping standard requires that issuers “make 
and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accu-
rately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer.”9 The internal controls provision requires that issuers create a sys-
tem of internal accounting controls that provide “reasonable assurances” 
that transactions are executed in “accordance with management’s general 
or specific authorization.”10 
                                                                                                                         
Convention. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff). 
7 See § 78m(b)(2). 
8 See id. The FCPA applies to any issuer which has a class of securities registered under 
section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) or which is required 
to file reports under section 15(d) of the Exchange Act as well as to any officer, director, 
employee, or agent of such an issuer or any stockholder acting on behalf of such issuer. 
Id. § 78dd-1(a). This would include certain foreign companies that list stock on a U.S. 
securities exchange and their relevant personnel. Id. The relevant accounting provisions 
can be found in section 13(b)(2) of the Exchange Act, which specifically require issuers 
to keep accurate books and records and establish and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls. Id. § 78m(b)(2). In addition, the SEC has adopted two rules related 
to the accounting provisions. Rule 13b2-1 provides that “[n]o person shall directly or 
indirectly, falsify or cause to be falsified, any book, record or account subject to Section 
13(b)(2)(A)” of the Exchange Act. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13b2-1 (2014). Rule 13b2-2 prohibits 
a director or officer of an issuer from making or causing to be made any materially false 
or misleading statement or omission in connection with any audit. Id. § 240.13b2-2. 
9 See § 78m(b)(2)(A). The term “reasonable detail” is defined to mean “such level of 
detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their 
own affairs.” Id. § 78(m)(b)(7). 
10 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B). The provision specifically requires that issuers: 
devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that- (i) transactions are executed in ac-
cordance with management’s general or specific authorization; (ii) transac-
tions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial 
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles 
or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain ac-
countability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance 
with management’s general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded 
accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable 
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences .... 
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The FCPA anti-bribery provisions prohibit the bribing of foreign gov-
ernment officials for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or 
with, or directing business to, any person.11 More specifically, the FCPA anti-
bribery provisions prohibit: (1) any issuer, domestic concern, or any officer, 
director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on behalf of any of the fore-
going; (2) from using any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
“corruptly” in furtherance of; (3) an offer, payment, or promise to pay, or 
authorization of the payment of anything of value; (4) to (a) any “foreign 
official,” (b) any foreign political party or party official, (c) any candidate for 
foreign political office, (d) any public international organization official, or 
(e) any other person while “knowing” that the payment or promise to pay will 
be given to any of the foregoing; (5) for the purpose of (a) influencing any 
act or decision of that person in his or her official capacity, (b) inducing that 
person to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, (c) secur-
ing any improper advantage, or (d) inducing that person to use his influence 
with a foreign government to affect or influence any government act or deci-
sion; (6) in order to assist such issuer, domestic concern, or person acting 
within U.S. territory, in obtaining or retaining business, or directing busi-
ness to any person.12 
There are two affirmative defenses to the FCPA anti-bribery provisions.13 
The first affirmative defense applies when the payment at issue is lawful 
under the written laws of a relevant foreign official’s country.14 The second 
affirmative defense allows for payments that are considered “reasonable and 
bona fide” expenditures “such as travel and lodging expenses” incurred by 
foreign officials directly related to “the promotion, demonstration, or explana-
tion of products or services” or “the execution or performance of a contract 
with a foreign government or agency ....”15 There is also an exception to the 
anti-bribery provisions that allows for so-called “facilitation” or “grease 
payments” to foreign officials for the purposes of expediting or securing the 
                                                                                                                         
Id. Civil liability may be found with respect to violations of the accounting provisions, 
and criminal liability may also be found under the accounting provisions when a person 
“knowingly” circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal accounting controls 
or “knowingly” falsifies the books and records. See id. § 78m(b)(2), (5). 
11 See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
12 Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). There is both criminal and civil liability for violations 
of the anti-bribery provisions and the provisions have been incorporated into the federal 
securities laws as section 30A of the Exchange Act. See id. § 78dd-1(a). Issuers subject to 
the anti-bribery provisions are the same as the relevant issuers subject to the accounting 
provisions. Id.; see also supra note 8 and accompanying discussion. 
13 See id. §§ 78dd-1(c), -2(c), -3(c). 
14 See id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). 
15 Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2), -3(c)(2). 
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performance of a “routine governmental action” such as obtaining permits 
or processing visas.16 
B. Definition of a “Foreign Official” 
Of relevance to this Article is the fact that the FCPA anti-bribery provi-
sions prohibit bribes paid to “foreign official[s].”17 The statute specifically 
defines “foreign official” as: 
any officer or employee of a foreign government or any depart-
ment, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public interna-
tional organization, or any person acting in an official capacity 
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, 
or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such public interna-
tional organization.18 
Under the definition of a “foreign official” it is clear that an individual of-
ficer or employee of a foreign government, or department or agency of a 
foreign government, would be considered a “foreign official” for purposes 
of the FCPA.19 What is not so clear is when an individual officer or em-
ployee would be deemed to be working for an “instrumentality” of a foreign 
                                                                                                                         
16 Id. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b). The term “routine government action” means any action 
which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign official, such as obtaining permits, 
processing visas, and lining up basic services. Id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A),-3(f)(4)(A). 
Specifically, the FCPA defines “routine government action” as: 
an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign of-
ficial in— (i) obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to 
qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; (ii) processing 
governmental papers, such as visas and work orders; (iii) providing police 
protection, mail pick-up and delivery, or scheduling inspections associ-
ated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods 
across the country; (iv) providing phone service, power and water sup-
ply, loading and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or 
commodities from deterioration; or (v) actions of a similar nature. 
Id. Payments made to expedite any of the basic services listed above or “of a similar nature,” 
are not considered payments prohibited by the FCPA. Id. §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b). The 
facilitation payments exception is an exception only to the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions 
and is not an exception to the accounting provisions. See Lucinda A. Low et al., Enforcement 
of the FCPA in the United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, 1665 
PLI/CORP 711, 724–25 (2008). Issuers that make facilitation payments are required to 
properly record such payments in their books and records under the accounting provisions. 
Id.; § 78m(b)(2). 
17 See id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
18 See id. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), -2(h)(2)(A), -3(f)(2)(A). 
19 Id. 
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government so as to make such an individual a “foreign official” under the 
FCPA. This is because “instrumentality” of a foreign government has not 
been defined within the FCPA. Instead, the term has been left open to inter-
pretation by the DOJ and SEC through FCPA enforcement actions and the 
courts.20 And at least until the Esquenazi decision, the meaning of the term 
“instrumentality,” and whether individual officers and employees of state-
owned entities could be considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA, was 
considered by some to be an open question of law.21 
II. PREVIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF “INSTRUMENTALITY” UNDER THE FCPA 
Prior to the Eleventh Circuit decision in Esquenazi, there were two deci-
sions in the Central District of California that looked into the issue as to when 
an entity, more specifically a state-owned entity, could be considered an 
“instrumentality” of a foreign government so as to qualify individuals under 
that entity as being “foreign officials” under the FCPA.22 The DOJ and 
SEC, in recent FCPA guidance, also provided their interpretation of the 
term “instrumentality.”23 
A. Federal Court Opinions on Instrumentality 
Prior to the Esquenazi decision, there were at least two decisions in the 
Central District of California that included interpretations of the term 
“instrumentality” involving cases brought by the DOJ concerning alleged 
violations of the FCPA.24 
1. United States v. Aguilar (Lindsey Manufacturing) 
In 2011, a federal court addressed the issue as to when a state-owned en-
terprise could be considered an “instrumentality” of a foreign government in 
a detailed order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss in United States v. 
Aguilar, et al. (“Lindsey”).25 In Lindsey, the DOJ filed a case against Lindsey 
                                                                                                                         
20 See infra notes 25–53 and accompanying discussion. 
21 See Giunta et al., supra note 4, at 5; Roger M. Witten et al., supra note 4, at 5. 
22 See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1110–17 (C.D. Cal. 2011); United 
States v. Carson, No. SACR 9-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1–8 (C.D. Cal. 2011). 
23 Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 20–21. 
24 See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110–17; Carson, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1–8. 
25 See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. It should be noted that the issue as to the meaning 
of “instrumentality” was litigated in the case of United States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen; how-
ever, there was no written federal court opinion directly providing any kind of interpretation 
on this issue other than a simple order denying the relevant defendants’ motion to dismiss. See 
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, No. 08-CR-522-
TJS (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009). The government’s pleadings in the Nguyen case, including 
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Manufacturing Company and two of its executives for alleged FCPA 
violations in the United States District Court for the Central District of 
California.26 In the case, the DOJ alleged that the company and its employ-
ees paid bribes to two high-ranking employees of the Comisión Federal de 
Electricidad (“CFE”), an electric utility company wholly owned by the gov-
ernment of Mexico.27 The defendants moved to dismiss the case and raised 
the issue as to “whether an officer or employee of a state-owned corporation 
can be a ‘foreign official’ for purposes of FCPA liability.”28 The defend-
ants argued that “under no circumstances” can an officer or employee of a 
state-owned corporation be considered a foreign official “because under no 
circumstances can a state-owned corporation be a department, agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign government.”29 
On April 20, 2011, the court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, 
ruling that a state-owned enterprise having attributes of the CFE may be an 
“instrumentality” of a foreign government under the FCPA, and therefore 
officers and employees of such an entity may be “foreign officials” within 
the meaning of the FCPA.30 In making its decision, the court provided a 
“non-exclusive” list of “various characteristics of government agencies and 
departments that fall within” the description of “instrumentality.”31 The 
“non-exclusive” list included the following characteristics: 
                                                                                                                         
the order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, can be found on the DOJ’s website. 
FCPA and Related Enforcement Actions: United States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/nguyenn.html (last visited Mar. 26, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/3BX9-998T. 
26 See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. It should be noted that Lindsey Manufacturing 
was the first company to be tried and convicted of FCPA violations. See Samuel Rubenfeld, 
Lindsey Manufacturing Defendants Convicted on all Counts, Corruption Currents, WALL 
ST. J. BLOGS (May 10, 2011, 3:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011 
/05/10/lindsey-manufacturing-defendants-convicted-on-all-counts/, archived at http:// perma 
.cc/FB8Z-2MSJ. The company executives were convicted at trial as well. Id. However, the 
convictions were vacated, and indictment dismissed, after a federal court judge ruled that 
the prosecution had engaged in misconduct. Order Granting Motion to Dismiss, United 
States v. Aguilar, No. CR 10-01031(A)-AHM (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2011); Christopher M. 
Matthews, Judge Dismisses Landmark Bribery Conviction, Rips DOJ, WALL ST. J. BLOGS 
(Dec. 1, 2011, 6:57 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents /2011/12/01/judge-dis 
misses-landmark-bribery-conviction-rips-doj/, archived at http://perma.cc/L55A-CCGQ. 
The DOJ voluntarily dismissed the case in May 2012. Ellen Podgor, Government Dismisses 
Lindsey Manufacturing Case Appeal, WHITE COLLAR CRIME PROF BLOG (May 25, 2012), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/2012/05/government-dismisses-lind 
sey-manufacturing-case-appeal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WW22-7CPR. 
27 See Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1109. 
28 Id. at 1110. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1115. 
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x The entity provides a service to the citizens—indeed, in 
many cases to all the inhabitants—of the jurisdiction. 
x The key officers and directors of the entity are, or are ap-
pointed by, government officials. 
x The entity is financed, at least in large measure, through gov-
ernmental appropriations or through revenues obtained as a 
result of government-mandated taxes, licenses, fees or roy-
alties, such as entrance fees to a national park. 
x The entity is vested with and exercises exclusive or control-
ling power to administer its designated functions. 
x The entity is widely perceived and understood to be per-
forming official (i.e., governmental) functions.32 
The court then applied the factors above and found that the CFE had all of 
the characteristics of an instrumentality and therefore that officers and em-
ployees of the CFE could be considered “foreign officials” under the FCPA.33 
2. United States v. Carson 
In United States v. Carson, a different judge in the same federal district 
court where Lindsey was decided also looked at the issue as to whether em-
ployees of state-owned companies can be “foreign officials” under the 
FCPA.34 In Carson, the DOJ alleged that the defendants paid bribes to of-
ficers and employees of multiple foreign state-owned customers of their 
company between 2003 and 2007.35 Like the defendants in Lindsey, the de-
fendants in Carson moved to dismiss certain counts of the indictment ar-
guing that employees of state-owned companies can never be “foreign 
officials” under the FCPA.36 In this respect, the defendants argued that “state-
owned companies are not departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of a 
foreign government,” and therefore any bribes paid to employees of them 
would not be bribes paid to “foreign officials” under the FCPA.37 
In a May 18, 2011 ruling, the Carson court denied the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss concluding “that the question of whether state-owned compa-
nies qualify as instrumentalities under the FCPA is a question of fact.”38 In 
                                                                                                                         
32 Id. 
33 See id. 
34 See United States v. Carson, No. SACR 9-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, at *1 
(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011). 
35 Id. at *1–2. 
36 Id. at *1. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at *3. 
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this respect the court stated that “simply assuming that a company is wholly 
owned by the state is insufficient for the court to determine as a matter of law 
whether the company constitutes a government ‘instrumentality.’”39 Instead, 
the court said that “several factors bear on the question of whether a busi-
ness entity constitutes a government instrumentality.”40 The court then listed 
the following factors as bearing on the question of whether a business entity 
constitutes a government instrumentality: 
x The foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its 
employees; 
x The foreign state’s degree of control over the entity; 
x The purpose of the entity’s activities; 
x The entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign 
state’s law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive 
or controlling power to administer its designated functions; 
x The circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; and 
x The foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity, including 
the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies, 
special tax treatment, and loans).41 
In providing the above factors, the court noted that these factors were “not 
exclusive” and that “no single factor” was “dispositive.”42 The court stated 
that the factors’ “chief utility” was “simply to point out that several types 
of evidence are relevant when determining whether a state-owned company 
constitutes an ‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA—with state ownership being 
only one of several considerations.”43 
B. FCPA Resource Guide 
Another source of guidance prior to Esquenazi as to the definition of a 
foreign official, and what constitutes an instrumentality of a foreign gov-
ernment, came from the DOJ and SEC in a “Resource Guide” to the FCPA 
                                                                                                                         
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at *3–4. 
42 Id. at *4. 
43 Id. The court clarified that “a mere monetary investment in a business entity by the 
government may not be sufficient” in itself “to transform that entity into a governmental 
instrumentality.” Id. at *5. However it noted that “when a monetary investment is combined 
with additional factors that objectively indicate the entity is being used as an instrument 
to carry out governmental objectives, that business entity would qualify as a governmental 
instrumentality.” Id. 
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published in November 2012.44 The FCPA Resource Guide, intended to help 
companies comply with the FCPA, is significant in that it came out after 
the Lindsey and Carson decisions, cited to those decisions in providing guid-
ance on the definition of a foreign official, and was written by the two agen-
cies in charge of enforcing the FCPA.45 
The FCPA Resource Guide (“Guide”) stated that what constitutes a gov-
ernment department or agency, for purposes of the definition of a foreign 
official, is “typically clear” when foreign governments are organized in a 
way similar to the United States government.46 The Guide noted, however, 
that governments could be organized in many different ways and that “many 
operate through state-owned and state-controlled entities ....”47 To this extent, 
the Guide stated that “[b]y including officers or employees of agencies and 
instrumentalities within the definition of ‘foreign official,’” the FCPA 
accounted “for this variability.”48 
As to the meaning of the term “instrumentality,” the Guide stated that 
the term was “broad” and could “include state-owned or state-controlled 
entities.”49 The Guide, citing to Lindsey and Carson among other cases, then 
stated, “[w]hether a particular entity constitutes an ‘instrumentality’ under 
the FCPA requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, 
status, and function.”50 The Guide noted that “a number of courts have 
approved final jury instructions” providing factors to be considered when 
determining whether an entity is an “instrumentality” and then listed the 
following non-exclusive list of relevant factors: 
x the foreign state’s extent of ownership of the entity; 
x the foreign state’s degree of control over the entity (including 
whether key officers and directors of the entity are, or are 
appointed by, government officials); 
                                                                                                                         
44 See Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 19–21. 
45 See id. at Foreword, 19–21, 109 n.119. 
46 Id. at 20. 
47 Id. The FCPA Resource Guide stated that many governments operate through state-
owned and state-controlled entities “particularly in such areas as aerospace and defense 
manufacturing, banking and finance, healthcare and life sciences, energy and extractive 
industries, telecommunications, and transportation.” Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 20, 109 n.119 (citing, among other cases, United States v. Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 
2d 1108, 1110 (C.D. Cal. 2011); and, United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 
2011 WL 5101701, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 18, 2011)); Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, 
United States v. Nam Quoc Nguyen, No. 08-CR-522-TJS (E.D. Pa. Dec. 30, 2009). The 
Guide noted that the relevant federal court decisions were “consistent with the acceptance 
by district courts around the country of over 35 guilty pleas by individuals who admitted 
to violating the FCPA by bribing officials of state-owned or state-controlled entities.” 
Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 109 n.119. 
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x the foreign state’s characterization of the entity and its em-
ployees; 
x the circumstances surrounding the entity’s creation; 
x the purpose of the entity’s activities; 
x the entity’s obligations and privileges under the foreign 
state’s law; 
x the exclusive or controlling power vested in the entity to 
administer its designated functions; 
x the level of financial support by the foreign state (including 
subsidies, special tax treatment, government-mandated fees, 
and loans); 
x the entity’s provisions of services to the jurisdiction’s resi-
dents; 
x whether the government end or purpose sought to be achieved 
is expressed in the policies of the foreign government; and 
x the general perception that the entity is performing official 
or governmental functions.51 
The FCPA Resource Guide stressed that “[c]ompanies should consider 
these factors when evaluating the risk of FCPA violations and designing 
compliance programs.”52 The Guide also stated that the DOJ and SEC 
have “long used an analysis of ownership, control, status, and function to 
determine whether a particular entity is an agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign government.”53 
                                                                                                                         
51 Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 20, 109 n.120 (citing Jury Instructions, United 
States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912 (11th Cir. 2014); Order at 5 and Jury Instructions, Carson, 
2011 WL 5101701; and Jury Instructions, Aguilar, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1108). 
52 Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 20. 
53 Id. at 20–21, 109 nn.121–22 (citing Criminal Information, United States v. C.E. Miller 
Corp., No. 82-cr-788 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 1982); Complaint, SEC v. Sam P. Wallace Co., No. 
81-cv-1915 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1982); Criminal Information, United States v. Sam P. Wallace 
Co., No. 83-cr-34 (D.P.R. Feb. 23, 1983)). The Guide stated that the “DOJ and SEC 
continue to regularly bring FCPA cases involving bribes paid to employees of agencies 
and instrumentalities of foreign governments” and cited to recent cases where they 
charged bribes paid to state-owned and controlled entities. Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 
21, 110 nn.123–24 (citing Complaint, SEC v. ABB, Ltd., No-10-cv-1648 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 
2010); Criminal Information at 3, United States v. ABB Inc., No. 10-cr-664 (S.D. Tex. 
Sept. 29, 2010); Indictment at 2, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-cr-21010 (S.D. Fla. 
Dec. 4, 2009)). The Guide also noted that “[w]hile no one factor is dispositive or nec-
essarily more important than another, as a practical matter, an entity is unlikely to qualify 
as an instrumentality if a government does not own or control a majority of its shares.” 
Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 21. However, the Guide cautioned that there were 
“circumstances in which an entity would qualify as an instrumentality absent 50% or 
greater foreign government ownership,” which was “reflected in the limited number of 
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III. U.S. VS. ESQUENAZI 
On May 16, 2014, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued 
its decision in Esquenazi, which defined the term “instrumentality” of a for-
eign government as the term is used in the FCPA’s definition of a “foreign 
official.”54 The decision was the first time a federal appellate court had de-
fined what constituted an “instrumentality” of a foreign government under 
the statute.55 
In Esquenazi, the two defendant appellants in the case, Joel Esquenazi 
and Carlos Rodriquez, were convicted by a federal jury for their alleged 
roles in paying bribes in violation of the FCPA to employees of Telecom-
munications D’Haiti, S.A.M. (Teleco).56 The two defendants co-owned a 
company that purchased phone time from international vendors and then 
resold the minutes to United States customers.57 One of the company’s main 
vendors was Teleco, a company that had a state-sanctioned monopoly on 
telecommunications services in Haiti, which was owned by the Haitian 
government, as indicated by evidence produced at trial.58 More specifically, 
testimony heard by the district court revealed that the Haitian government 
gave Teleco a monopoly on telecommunication services when Teleco was 
formed in 1968, that the National Bank of Haiti took on a 97 percent owner-
ship of Teleco in the early 1970s, and that the Haitian President appointed all 
                                                                                                                         
DOJ or SEC enforcement actions brought in such situations.” Id. As an example the 
Guide cited to a case in which a French issuer’s subsidiaries were convicted of paying 
bribes to employees of a Malaysian telecommunications company that was only 43 per-
cent owned by Malaysia’s Ministry of Finance but was substantially controlled by the 
Malaysian government. Id. at 21, 110 n.125 (citing Criminal Information at 30–31, United 
States v. Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A., No. 10-cr-20906 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2010)). 
54 See United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 920, 925 (11th Cir. 2014). 
55 See U.S. v. Esquenazi: The Eleventh Circuit Broadly Defines “Foreign Official” 
under the FCPA, FCPA Update, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP (May 20, 2014), available at http:// 
www.sidley.com/US-v-Esquenazi-The-Eleventh-Circuit-Broadly-Defines-Foreign-Official
-Under-the-FCPA-05-20-2014/, archived at http://perma.cc/N3AD-63YJ; Eleventh Circuit 
Issues much Anticipated Opinion Defining “Foreign Official” under the FCPA, Client 
Memorandum, CLIFFORD CHANCE (May 2014) at 1, available at http://www.cliffordchance 
.com/briefings/2014/05/eleventh_circuitissuesmuchanticipatedopinio.html; Rubenfeld, supra 
note 1. 
56 See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 917. Esquenazi was sentenced to fifteen years in prison and 
Rodriquez was sentenced to seven years in prison. Id. at 920. The fifteen-year sentence for 
Esquenazi is significant in that it is, to date, the longest prison sentence ever imposed for vio-
lations of the FCPA. See Federal Appellate Court Rules that the FCPA Prohibits Corrupt 
Payments to Certain Foreign Government-Owned Businesses, JONES DAY (May 2014), 
available at http://www.jonesday.com/federal-appellate-court-rules-that-the-fcpa-prohib 
its-corrupt-payments-to-certain-foreign-government-owned-businesses-05-23-2014/. 
57 See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 917. 
58 See id. at 917–19. 
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of Teleco’s board members during the relevant time.59 In addition, evidence 
indicated that the defendants considered Teleco to be a state-controlled entity 
in that they sought “political-risk insurance” on their contracts with Teleco, a 
type of insurance coverage that applies only when a foreign government is 
a party to an agreement.60 
On appeal, the defendants argued, among other things, that Teleco was 
not an instrumentality of a foreign government so as to make employees of 
it “foreign officials” under the FCPA.61 They argued that the term “instru-
mentality” did not encompass state-controlled identities that do not perform 
governmental functions.62 They also argued that the term instrumentality 
should be limited to only include entities that perform public functions tra-
ditionally carried out by the government.63 
A. Court’s Analysis 
In rendering its decision, the court stated that the “central question” be-
fore it was what the term “instrumentality” meant.64 The court stated that the 
FCPA did not define the term and that no court of appeals had previously 
provided a definition for it.65 It therefore took on the task of defining 
“instrumentality” for purposes of the FCPA.66 
In construing the statutory text for the meaning of the word “instru-
mentality,” the court looked at various sources for providing a definition.67 
The court considered the plain meaning of the word as defined under Black’s 
Law Dictionary and Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.68 The 
court also looked for interpretation of the term under the “commonsense 
cannon of noscitur a sociis[,]” which means “a word is known by the com-
pany it keeps.”69 In this regard, the court noted that the company that the 
term “instrumentality” kept in the statute was “agency” and “department,” 
which were “entities through which the government performs its functions 
                                                                                                                         
59 See id. at 913. 
60 Id. at 914. 
61 Id. at 921–22. 
62 See id. at 922, 925, 935–36. 
63 See id. at 929, 935–36. 
64 Id. at 920 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(h)(2)(a) (2012)). 
65 See id. at 933–34. 
66 See id. at 920. 
67 See generally infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text. 
68 See Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 921. 
69 Id. at 921 (citing United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008); Edison v. 
Douberly, 604 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Green v. City of New York, 465 
F.3d 65, 79 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 
307 (1961)))). 
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and that are controlled by the government.”70 It then gleaned from this con-
text that for an entity to qualify as an “instrumentality,” it “must be under the 
control or dominion of the government” and it “must be doing the business of 
the government.”71 
The court’s analysis then turned on what activities constitute “doing the 
business of the government.”72 The defendants had argued that because 
Teleco provided the commercial service of phone service, that it was not 
performing a governmental function and therefore could not be an instru-
mentality.73 But the court rejected that argument, noting that the FCPA 
“expressly contemplates” that in “some instances” commercial activity would 
be a government function.74 In this respect, the court looked at the FCPA’s 
facilitation payments exception and noted that the definition of “routine 
governmental action” as used in the exception includes “providing phone 
service.”75 In this respect, the court stated that it could not determine entities 
engaged in commercial activities to be precluded from being an “instrumen-
tality” because to do so “would render meaningless” the relevant portions of 
the FCPA’s facilitation payments exception.76 
The court also looked at a statement by the Supreme Court that “the con-
cept of a ‘usual’ or a ‘proper’ government function changes over time and 
varies from nation to nation” and felt that this “principle” should guide its 
construction of the term “instrumentality.”77 In this respect, the court stated 
that “to decide in a given case whether a foreign entity to which a domestic 
concern makes a payment is an instrumentality of that foreign govern-
ment, we ought to look to whether that foreign government considered the 
entity to be performing a government function.”78 The court felt that “the 
most objective way to make that decision is to examine the foreign sover-
eign’s actions, namely, whether it treats the function the foreign entity 
performs as its own.”79 
                                                                                                                         
70 Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 922. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 See id. at 926. 
74 Id. at 922–23. 
75 Id. at 922 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b), -2(h)(4)(A) (2012)). 
76  Id. at 922. As part of its analysis the court also reviewed the United States’ 
obligation under the OECD Convention, and the relevant 1998 amendments to the FCPA 
to implement the Convention, and determined that a broad array of activities could qual-
ify as government functions for purposes of the FCPA. Id. at 922–25 (citing to OECD 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Feb. 15, 1999), at arts. 1.1, 1.4(a), art. 1.4 cmt. 14 and 15; and 1998 FCPA 
Amendments, supra note 6). 
77 Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 924–25 (citing to First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Para El 
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 42 U.S. 611, 634 n. 27 (1983)). 
78 Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 924–25. 
79 Id. 
678 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:663 
B. Definition of “Instrumentality” Under the FCPA 
The court stated that “[a]lthough we believe Teleco would qualify as a 
Haitian instrumentality under almost any definition we could craft, we are 
mindful of the needs of both corporations and the government for ex ante 
direction about what an instrumentality is.”80 With this guidance, and based 
on its analysis, the court then set out a two-part test for when an entity consti-
tutes an “instrumentality” for purposes of the FCPA and formally defined 
“instrumentality” under the FCPA as “an entity controlled by the government 
of a foreign country; that performs a function the controlling government 
treats as its own.”81 
The court then stressed that “what constitutes control and what consti-
tutes a function the government treats as its own are fact-bound questions.”82 
Nevertheless, it provided non-exhaustive lists of factors for courts and 
juries to consider in determining whether one or both parts of the “instru-
mentality” definition are met.83 
1. Government Control Element 
In order to determine whether a government “controls” an entity, the Es-
quenazi court said that courts and juries should consider the following factors: 
x the foreign government’s formal designation of that entity; 
x whether the government has a majority interest in the entity; 
x the government’s ability to hire and fire the entity’s princi-
pals; 
x the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any, go directly 
into the governmental fisc, and, by the same token, the ex-
tent to which the government funds the entity if it fails to 
break even; and 
x the length of time these indicia have existed.84 
                                                                                                                         
80 Id. at 925. 
81 Id. The court was specifically addressing the term “instrumentality” as used under 
section 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) which applies to “domestic concerns.” Id. However there is no 
reason why this definition would not also apply to the term “instrumentality” as used in 
section 30A 78dd-1 of the FCPA which applies to issuers. Id. 
82 Id. In this respect it stated that “[i]t would be unwise and likely impossible to ex-
haustively answer them in the abstract.” Id. 
83 Id. The court stated that “[b]ecause we only have this case before us, we do not 
purport to list all of the factors that might prove relevant in deciding whether an entity is 
an instrumentality of a foreign government.” Id. 
84 Id. The court stated that “[w]e do not cut these factors from whole cloth” but 
“[r]ather, they are informed by commentary to the OECD Convention the United States 
 
2015] “INSTRUMENTALITY” UNDER THE FCPA 679 
2. Government Function Element 
In order to determine whether an entity at issue “performs a function the 
government treats as its own,” the Esquenazi court said that courts and juries 
should consider the following factors: 
x whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists 
to carry out; 
x whether the government subsidizes the costs associated with 
the entity providing services; 
x whether the entity provides services to the public at large in 
the foreign country; and 
x whether the public and the government of that foreign coun-
try generally perceive the entity to be performing a govern-
mental function.85 
As applied to the facts of the case, the court then looked at its construction 
of the term “instrumentality” and found “little difficulty” in concluding that 
the evidence supported the jury’s finding that Teleco was an instrumentality 
of Haiti.86 
                                                                                                                         
ratified” and “are consistent with the approach the Supreme Court has taken to decide if 
an entity is an agent or instrumentality of the government in analogous contexts.” Id. at 
925–26 (citing OECD Convention, supra note 76, at art. 1.4, cmt. 14; Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394, 497–99 (1995); Cherry Cotton Mills, Inc. v. United 
States, 327 U.S. 536, 539 (1946); and Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. J.G. Menihan Corp., 
312 U.S. 81, 83 (1941)). 
85 Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 913. Like for the government control element, the court 
noted that it drew up the factors for the government function element based in part from 
the OECD Convention and Supreme Court cases that discussed “what entities properly 
can be considered carrying out governmental functions.” Id. (citing to OECD Convention, 
supra note 76, at art. 1.4, cmt. 15; Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 
531 U.S. 288, 295–97 (2001); Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 312 U.S. at 83; and Cherry Cotton 
Mills, Inc., 327 U.S. at 539). 
86 Esquenazi, 752 F.3d at 928. The court noted that since Teleco’s creation Haiti had 
granted the “company a monopoly over telecommunications service and gave it various 
tax advantages.” Id. at 929. It also noted that starting in the early 1970s and during the 
time that the defendants were involved that Teleco was 97 percent owned by Haiti’s 
national bank. Id. at 929. It further noted that Teleco’s Director General was chosen by 
the Haitian President and with the consent of the Haitian Prime Minister and ministers of 
public works and economic finance and that the President of Haiti appointed all of the 
board members of Teleco. Id. at 928. Finally the court noted that the DOJ’s expert testified 
that Teleco belonged “totally to the state” and that it was considered a “public entity.” Id. 
at 918. Based on these facts, and “[c]onstrued in the light most favorable to the jury’s 
verdict,” the court felt “that evidence was sufficient to show Teleco was controlled by the 
Haitian government and performed a function Haiti treated as its own, namely, nationalized 
telecommunication services.” Id. at 929. 
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IV. COMMENTARY ON ESQUENAZI DECISION 
Following the Esquenazi decision, there were many commentaries and 
opinions expressed by professionals in the FCPA field on what the decision 
stood for and how it would affect future compliance and enforcement efforts. 
Many commenters shared the same views. 
A prevailing opinion shared by many commenters was that the Esquenazi 
decision validated the DOJ and SEC’s broad interpretation of who quali-
fies as a “foreign official.”87 Some commenters noted that the DOJ and SEC 
had brought many cases concerning corrupt practices involving state-owned 
entities.88 They also noted that the DOJ and SEC confirmed their broad 
interpretation of “instrumentality” in the FCPA Resource Guide when the 
Guide stated that the term could “include state-owned and state-controlled 
entities” and advocated a fact-intensive test for determining what consti-
tutes an instrumentality.89 In this respect, many concluded that the Esquenazi 
court validated the DOJ and SEC’s broad interpretation of who qualifies 
as a foreign official and sided with the DOJ and SEC in articulating a fact-
intensive test for what constitutes an instrumentality.90 
                                                                                                                         
87  See SEC Update: Federal Appeals Court Upholds Enforcement Agencies’ Broad 
Interpretation of Government “Instrumentality” under FCPA, HOGAN LOVELLS (May 30, 
2014), available at http://www.hoganlovells.com/federal-appeals-court-upholds-enforce 
ment-agencies-broad-interpretation-of-government-instrumentality-under-fcpa-05-30-2014/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4CQF-EGVX. In this respect, these commenters noted that in 
some cases, such as Lindsey, “defense lawyers have countered that such broad definitions 
cannot apply where a company acts as a commercial participant in a country’s economy.” Id. 
88 Id. 
89 U.S. Appellate Court Defines Government “Instrumentality” under the FCPA, FCPA 
Update, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP, May 2014, vol. 5, no. 10, at 5 (citing to Resource 
Guide, supra note 3, at 20–21), available at http://perma.cc/WV4C-ZC67. The FCPA 
Resource Guide has stated “[w]hether a particular entity constitutes an ‘instrumentality’ 
under the FCPA requires a fact-specific analysis of an entity’s ownership, control, status, and 
function.” Resource Guide, supra note 3, at 20; see also supra note 51, and accompany-
ing discussion. 
90 See DEBEVOISE, supra note 89, at 5; Charles E. Duross, Court of Appeals Hands 
Down Landmark FCPA Ruling Defining the Term “Instrumentality”, Client Alert, MORRISON 
FOERSTER, May 22, 2014, at 1, archived at http://perma.cc/S9AW-3422; Eleventh Circuit 
Addresses Scope of FCPA Coverage of Activity Involving State-Controlled Business 
Enterprises, SKADDEN (May 20, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6ZSN-XBDH; FCPA 
Jurisprudence: U.S. Court of Appeals (11th Circuit) Defines “Instrumentality” under the 
FCPA, Adopts Government’s View, Client Memorandum, DAVIS POLK (May 21, 2014) at 2, 
available at http://www.davispolk.com/resources/all?nid=56034&field_pb_publication 
_type_tid_1=5898, archived at http://perma.cc/68LA-KWVD; HOGAN LOVELLS, supra 
note 87, at 1, 3; Martin Weinstein et al., Client Memorandum: Landmark Decision Issued 
on the Scope of the Terms “Foreign Official” and “Instrumentality” under the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (May 20, 2014) at 2, archived 
at http://perma.cc/9XKZ-E6S9. 
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In light of the view that the Esquenazi decision affirmed the DOJ and 
SEC’s broad interpretation of who qualifies as a foreign official, some viewed 
Esquenazi as a victory for the government and saw the decision as em-
boldening the DOJ and SEC in their FCPA enforcement efforts in that they 
now had the backing of an appellate court.91 In this respect, some felt that 
the decision would make it more difficult for defense counsel to argue that 
the term “instrumentality” was still an “open question” of the law, as had 
been done prior to the decision.92 Some also felt that the government was 
likely to treat the issue over the definition of instrumentality as “settled,” 
even for cases outside of the Eleventh Circuit.93 
Another prevailing view among commenters was that, while the Es-
quenazi decision provided clarity to the term “instrumentality,” it did not 
provide the type of bright-line rule that businesses long have sought.94 In 
this respect, some stated that entities hoping for additional clarity in the form 
of a “bright-line rule” or “clearly defined test” would be disappointed by the 
court’s decision.95 
Some commenters also noted that the Esquenazi court provided addi-
tional factors beyond what the courts and the FCPA Resource Guide had 
previously provided but failed to provide any kind of detail or guidance on 
them.96 Along these lines, some felt that the court did not do enough to elabo-
rate on the application or relative weight that should be rendered to the fac-
tors, and whether any one particular factor should be accorded greater 
weight than another when conducting an analysis.97 
                                                                                                                         
91 See Raymond Banoun et al., Cadwalader FCPA Advisor: Eleventh Circuit Defines 
“Instrumentality” Broadly Under the FCPA, CADWALADER (May 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LEC3-7B7P; DAVIS POLK, supra note 90, at 1; JONES DAY, supra note 
56, at 2; Lucinda A. Low et al., Eleventh Circuit Issues Long-awaited Decision in Haiti 
Teleco Case: Eschews Bright-line Test for FCPA “Instrumentalities”, STEPTOE (May 27, 
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/KRD3-KW4Y. Some also noted that the case was a 
victory for the government in that it affirmed the largest prison sentence in an FCPA 
case. See JONES DAY, supra note 56, at 2. 
92 Witten et al., supra note 4. Some felt that “companies will face even stronger 
headwinds than previously if they attempt to avoid prosecution based on an argument that 
the government body at issue did not perform ‘core’ governmental functions.” In First 
Ruling by a Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit Adopts Broad Definition of “Foreign 
Instrumentality” under the FCPA, OnPoint, DECHERT LLP (May 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/C9YJ-BHE9. 
93 Witten et al., supra note 4; see also Giunta et al., supra note 4. In this respect, some 
noted that “although the Court has jurisdiction over only three states, this decision is likely to 
be influential because it is the first appellate decision to address this crucial definition.” 
DECHERT, supra note 92. 
94 See Duross, supra note 90, at 1; Giunta et al., supra note 4; Witten et al., supra note 4. 
95 Duross, supra note 90, at 1. 
96 See DEBEVOISE supra note 89, at 5; Giunta et al., supra note 4. 
97 See DEBEVOISE supra note 89, at 5; Giunta et al., supra note 4; Michelle Shapiro et 
al., 11th Cir. Leaves Room for Debate over FCPA ‘Instrumentality’, LAW360 (May 20, 
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Some commenters also opined that gathering information for some of the 
factors may be difficult to do.98 They noted that the Esquenazi court stated 
that it would be “relatively easy to decide what functions a government treats 
as its own” in that both courts and businesses “have readily at hand the tools 
to conduct that inquiry.”99 However, some commenters disagreed with the 
court’s opinion that gathering such information would be “relatively easy,” 
noting that some companies have found gathering the type of relevant infor-
mation to be both time consuming and expensive.100 These commenters also 
noted that it is often difficult for companies to “determine the level of actual 
control a government has over” what would sometimes be considered a 
purely commercial operation.101 
Finally, there was a widely held belief among commenters that the Es-
quenazi decision would do little to change the current FCPA enforcement 
landscape.102 In this regard, many noted that since the Esquenazi decision 
basically affirmed the broad view that regulators had already taken, there 
would not likely be major changes to the DOJ and SEC’s enforcement pro-
gram because of the decision.103 
V. BEST PRACTICES IN LIGHT OF DECISION 
It is this author’s opinion that the Esquenazi decision, and the court’s 
broad interpretation of the term “instrumentality,” will likely be the prevailing 
law in the area for a long time to come.104 Therefore, this author believes 
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that companies should consider adopting certain best practices and modifi-
cations to their compliance programs in light of the decision. 
Probably the most important practice that companies should consider 
taking in light of Esquenazi is to review their current compliance programs to 
make sure that they address the factors laid out by the court in the decision. 
The compliance programs should identify when entities are instrumentalities 
under the factors laid out in Esquenazi and then prohibit payments to agents 
and employees of such entities.105 In this regard, companies should review 
and modify their compliance programs accordingly to make sure that their 
programs are structured to sufficiently evaluate whether the entities that they 
are conducting business with meet the two-part test under Esquenazi of being 
under the control of a foreign government and performing a government 
function.106 The modifications to the compliance programs should then pro-
hibit any payments made to agents, officers, or employees of entities that 
meet the two-part test. The compliance programs should also call for particu-
lar scrutiny over entities that hold, or may hold, a monopoly over a service in 
a foreign country.107 
In addition, companies should review and potentially modify their anti-
bribery training procedures to ensure that company employees are aware that 
the FCPA covers dealings with a broad spectrum of entities, including a va-
riety of state-owned entities. The training provided about compliance pro-
grams should also ensure that company employees, as well as third parties 
acting on behalf of the company, are aware of who is a foreign official under 
the factors articulated in Esquenazi.108 
Companies should also take proactive steps to research and review their 
existing business relationships with entities in order to determine whether 
any of the relevant entities may be considered instrumentalities under the 
factors provided in Esquenazi.109 Companies should particularly scrutinize 
their relationships with third parties that interact with state-owned entities 
that could be considered instrumentalities. Companies should further con-
duct due diligence on future business relationships in order to determine 
whether potential entities that they may be dealing with may be considered 
instrumentalities. Finally, transactions with entities that may have any degree 
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of involvement with a foreign state should be carefully reviewed to identify 
whether such entities may be considered “instrumentalities” under the 
Esquenazi decision.110 
CONCLUSION 
Esquenazi was a landmark decision in that it was the first time that an 
appellate court defined the term “instrumentality” under the FCPA.111 It af-
firmed federal regulators’ long-held interpretation that the FCPA applied 
to state-owned and state-controlled entities.112 It also may have closed a 
contentious and open question of law as to whether state-owned and state-
controlled entities constitute “instrumentalities” of foreign governments under 
the FCPA.113 
The Esquenazi decision’s two-part test and expansive list of factors for 
when an entity may be considered an “instrumentality” should be carefully 
reviewed and followed. Companies should adopt certain best practices and 
modifications to their compliance programs to take into account the two-
part test and list of factors. Companies should also adjust their current com-
pliance and training programs accordingly in order to make sure that they 
are in compliance with the law. Those that take such proactive steps will be 
better prepared to stay in compliance with the FCPA in a post-Esquenazi 
compliance environment. 
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